Some Brief Thoughts on Logic, Metaphysics, Ethics, and Apologetics

Propositions can be either affirmative or negative. An affirmative proposition affirms that particular predicate y belongs to a particular logical subject x. A negative proposition denies that a particular predicate y belongs to a particular logical subject x. Let AP = Affirmative Proposition, and NP = Negative Proposition —

AP: x is y.
NP: x is not y.

These propositions differ with respect to their explicit affirmations and denials, yet they are both implicitly affirmative. For in order to deny that y is properly predicated of x, one has to first affirm that there is a logical subject x. That this is the case is important not only for the disciplines of logic and argumentation, but for metaphysics, ethics, and apologetics.

Metaphysically, if every proposition, negative or affirmative, implies that there is an existent x, then it follows that x is distinct from other existents. If x is distinct from other existents, then it follows that x has properties unique to itself. Thus, the affirmation or denial of a given predicate of a given logical subject implies essentialism. x and -x relations are, then, are determined by x and -x’s essential properties.

This implies that relations, abstractly considered, are not, and cannot be, random. Taken further, this implies that the relations that obtain between rational subjects are likewise determined by their essential properties. The ethical takeaway here is that relations between rational subjects are not, and cannot be, social constructs. The relations are inherent to the identity of the rational subjects in question, thus ethical judgments are judgments about which relations between rational subjects do or do not correspond to their essential properties.

In the domain of apologetics, the inescapable affirmation of x implies not only essentialism, and that relations between rational subjects are not social constructs, but, what is more, that identities are not foisted on otherwise amorphous entities. Instead, logical subjects are what they are by virtue of being. Evolutionary theory is, hereby, revealed to be a logical and metaphysical impossibility. Given any affirmation or denial implies that x has an essence, it follows that x cannot become some other logical subject. Any supposed modifications to a given logical subject can only concern those properties it possesses which are accidental/non-essential.

—h.