Identity, Essence, and Christian Anthropology
On the Accidentality of Communion with Other Humans
The Law of Identity and “Man”
The law of logic known as the Law of Identity is simple, but very important in any consideration of anthropology, especially that which is taught by the Scriptures. Formally, the law is stated as follows —
A:A
In plain English, the law states that any object A is identical to itself. This implies that A has a distinct attribute or set of attributes that set it apart from other objects (e.g. B, C, D, etc). And if A has a distinct attribute or set of attributes that set it apart from other objects, then A is essentially distinct from other objects. The universality of the law of identity requires me, then, to conclude that all objects have an essence. I may be mistaken as to what is essential to an object’s identity, but I can never be mistaken in thinking that it has an essence. For in denying that an object is self-identical, I am making an implicit claim about the essential nature of that object.
In light of this, we must consider the fact that this law necessarily applies to humans. In order for an object H to be identified as a human, it must possess an attribute or set of attributes which make it distinctly human. If H lacks an attribute or set of attributes which make it distinctly human, then H is not human. Thus, if we were to identify H as a human, while H lacks an attribute or set of attributes which are essential to it being distinctly human, we would be in error. And according to the law of the excluded middle in logic (A or -A), which is a corollary of the law of identity, it follows that either H is a human or H is not a human; there is no third option.
When we turn to the Scriptures in order to understand anthropology, then, we have to keep this basic truth in mind — If any rational being identifies an object as human, and that object does not possess an attribute or set of attributes which are essential to it being a human, then that rational being is either mistaken or lying. Given that God created Adam, and identified Adam as a human/man, it follows necessarily that Adam did not lack an attribute or set of attributes essential to him being a human. If one denies this, then one implies that God was either mistaken in identifying Adam as a human, or he was lying. God, however, cannot be mistaken or lie. Therefore, it follows that Adam lacked no attribute or set of attributes essential to him being a human.
The implication of Adam being identified infallibly, truthfully by God as a human is this — man did not require other humans, for any reason, in order for him to be a human. Adam lacked nothing, ontologically speaking, though he lacked a comparable companion with whom he could be fruitful and multiply. Adam’s identity as a human was not contingent upon the existence of other humans. Adam was not in need of communion in order for him to be a man. He was by virtue of existing; we know this because God identified Adam as such, and God cannot lie or be mistaken.
Adam was not a human and a non-human at the same time and in the same sense when the Holy Spirit declared that “the man” was formed by God and made a living being by means of the breath of life (cf. Gen 2:7). He was not a hybrid of human and non-human, moreover, when God commanded him to work and til the garden of Eden, and to refrain from eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. No. God created Adam, identified him as man, and held him accountable for fulfilling his duty to love God with all of his heart and strength. Communion with other humans was not requisite to his being a human, nor was it a prerequisite to him becoming responsible before God for keeping the law of God.
Constructivism and Communitarianism
This stands in contradiction to the prevailing anthropological model today known as constructivism. In this view, the self comes to be by means of a dialectical process. More specifically, the self is thought to be produced by dialogue between individuals in society. Given that having selfhood is essential to being a human, this implies that communion/dialogical exchanges with other humans is essential to one being a human. The constructivist theory comes from multiple sources, but can be traced back, in part, to Aristotle, through G.W.F. Hegel, Karl Marx, Mikhail Bakhtin, and postmodern philosophers who took the idea and dutifully drew out its logical consequences.
Postmodernists argued, for instance, that if the self is the product of communion with others, and communion with others is historically, geographically, economically, and ideological constrained, then it follows that there is no universal self. If there is no universal self, then there is no universal standard to which selves must conform — epistemologically, morally, or religiously. Postmodern philosopher Michel Foucault argues this throughout the corpus of his writings, famously stating that “man” (i.e. the human subject/self universally considered) is a “recent invention.” Mark Poster explains this in a little more detail —
Foucault in the theme of self-constitution gives greater prominence to language and in a more heuristic manner than other social theorists. The arts of living, the confessional, and the therapy session…are all discursive practices. The individual wrestles with self-constitution through the manipulation of symbols, through carefully elaborated and systematized rules of formation, enunciative statements, and so forth.1
Such a conception of the self as the product of various material forces/discursive practices is rooted in Foucault’s criticisms of the Enlightenment and Neo-Liberalism’s “overly abstract” concept of the subject/self, taking specific aim at René Descartes.
These criticisms gave rise to the development of what Mark Olssen calls Foucault’s “thin communitarianism.” Olssen writes —
For Foucault, the emergence of liberal individualism at the onset of modernity involved a bifurcation of individual from community, the care of the self from knowledge of the self, or ethics from reason (Descartes, Kant). Its social effects were to undermine community and promote individualizing forms of power.
[…]
In his analysis of the Greco Romans and Greeks, Foucault reinstated…a form of communitarianism whereby there is a conception of community necessitated by the social conditions of selfhood, and articulated, ideally, according to the principle of difference, which operates to safeguard democratic norms and maximize diversity in the context of a historicist and antitranscendental conception of knowledge.2
Thus, we see that dialogical selfhood is directly tied to material conditions which differ, and consequently inexorably leads to relativism.
What is more, this is the case even if one places constraints on their constructivist anthropology by stating that the development of the self through dialogical interactions comes to a final point (telos) that is potentially the same for all humans (namely, selfhood). For if the self comes to be through dialogical exchanges, then it follows that those who are incapable of dialogical exchanges are not selves and, therefore, are less than human. And if they are less than human, then there exists for them another standard to which these individuals are to be conformed. The standard would be universal, but only for those who count as humans (i.e. those whose selves have developed via dialogical exchanges).
Now one may not want to follow his thought’s development to its logical bitter end of creating a category of “sub-humans” (i.e. human-like entities lacking a dialogically form self), he may want to consider these individuals humans. However, if we were to grant this to him he would have to then acknowledge that the universal standard mentioned above is no longer universally applicable, and consequently accept relativism as the necessary logical consequence of his understanding of the self as the product of dialogical exchanges.
The dilemma facing the Christian promoting the idea that communion with other humans is essential to one being a human, then, is this — Either communion of this kind is essential, in which case there are humans and sub-humans with differing standards to which they must be conformed, or communion of this kind is not essential, in which case there are only humans and only one standard to which humans must conform. He cannot have a universal standard if he believes that communion with other humans is essential to being human, seeing as there are clearly many humans who do not and cannot dialogically engage/commune with other humans.
Christians must consider the consequences of accepting an anthropology which asserts that communion with other humans is requisite to one being human. Such a view implies that the unborn child, whose body is still being formed in the womb, is not a human. If he is not a human, then there is no moral injunction forbidding killing him in the womb. One may attempt to argue that he is potentially a human, in which case killing him would in principle amount to killing an actual human. However, what does one do with the unborn child who will be born with severe developmental issues rendering him unable to dialogically engage? Would killing him be equivalent to killing an actual human? If so, then communion with other humans is not requisite to one being a human.
To give another example, consider the case of a brain dead patient in a hospital. Given that he has ceased to dialogically engage/commune with other humans, and given that he will not be able to ever do so again, does it not follow that he has ceased being a human and can, therefore, be killed with impunity? One may attempt to argue that this is not a logical consequence of him being brain dead, because the patient would still be alive before God in the intermediate state. That, however, would again mean that communion with other humans is not requisite to one being a human.
Adam’s Obligation to God Before the Creation of Eve
The above considerations make it clear that communion with other humans is not essential to being human. One is a human by virtue of being created by God, as we saw from Gen 2:7. Communion with other humans is accidental. This is not only the case rationally, seeing as rationality logically and ontologically precedes communion and serves as its basis, but also Scripturally. What is essential to man being man is his individual, rational, volitional existence before God, who is always revealing himself to man.3 As an individual, rational, volitional being who was created to serve and love God, man perpetually stands in relationship to his Creator. Man is either a covenant breaker, or he is a covenant keeper.
Dialogical interactions with other humans presuppose the humanity of the self and the other, implying that both individuals are already human by virtue of existing, and already capable of relating to one another by virtue of being individual, rational, volitional beings who stand in relation to God. We see this clearly laid out in Genesis 2:7-20, where we read —
And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living being. Life in God’s Garden. The Lord God planted a garden eastward in Eden, and there He put the man whom He had formed. And out of the ground the Lord God made every tree grow that is pleasant to the sight and good for food. The tree of life was also in the midst of the garden, and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.
…Then the Lord God took the man and put him in the garden of Eden to tend and keep it. And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, “Of every tree of the garden you may freely eat; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall surely die.”
And the Lord God said, “It is not good that man should be alone; I will make him a helper comparable to him.” Out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field and every bird of the air, and brought them to Adam to see what he would call them. And whatever Adam called each living creature, that was its name. So Adam gave names to all cattle, to the birds of the air, and to every beast of the field. But for Adam there was not found a helper comparable to him.
Note that prior to God creating Eve, Adam is identified as man, given occupancy in a specific region of the earth (the garden of Eden), given the task of keeping and tilling the ground (i.e. agricultural work), and exercises dominion over the animals by (presumably) observing and naming them. Adam is exercising dominion over the earth, the animals and vegetation. By doing these things, Adam was fulfilling the end for which he was created — knowing, glorifying, and enjoying God. There is nothing which Adam lacks ontologically. The creation of Eve comes after Adam has been created, ordered to work in the garden, and given dominion over the animals and vegetation. Put more succinctly: Eve was not an addition to Adam’s being; she was literally subtracted from his already completed existence as the image of God.
Christ is in All Things Like Unto Us
While it is clear from what has been argued so far that communion with other humans is not essential to being human, we can demonstrate this from another angle, namely that of Christology. As has been discussed above, given the assumption that communion with other humans is essential to one being human, then it follows one who is incapable of dialogical exchanges with others is lacking an essential property of being humanity and, therefore, cannot properly be called human. We also looked at some individuals who would fall under the category of non-human given their inability to dialogically engage with humans, and specifically touched upon children in the womb.
Now, in light of those considerations we need to ask — Are those consequences compatible with orthodox Christology, or do they contradict orthodox Christology? According to the Chalcedonian Creed, Jesus Christ is
…truly God and truly man, of a rational soul and body; coessential with the Father according to the Godhead, and consubstantial with us according to the manhood; in all things like unto us…4
If orthodox Christology teaches that Christ has only two natures — divine and human — and he is, in regard to his human nature, “consubstantial” with all other humans, “in all things like unto us,” then it follows that dialogical selfhood cannot be the case. For if communion with other humans is requisite to one being a human, and the infant in the womb for some time cannot engage dialogically, then there is a time in which the infant is less than human. And if the infant is less than human, then he has two distinct non-divine natures, namely his pre-dialogical/non-human nature and his dialogical/human nature. Christ being fully man and in all things like unto us would imply that he, too, would have two distinct non-divine natures, in addition to his divine nature. This would render the Creed false, for it would follow from this that Christ would have three natures — pre-dialogical/non-human, dialogical/human, and divine.
This is, of course, foolishness. But that is the point. We know from Scripture that Christ has two distinct natures — divine and human. And we know that from the moment of conception this has been the case. In Luke 1:43, Mary’s relative Elizabeth asks Mary —
But why is this granted to me, that the mother of my Lord should come to me?
The question takes for granted that Mary was already a mother — of a human child — during the initial days of her pregnancy. It also takes for granted that “the fruit of [Mary’s] womb” was already the human son of David, Elizabeth’s Lord. While still in the womb, therefore, and without the ability to dialogically engage with other humans, the Lord Jesus Christ is acknowledged as human, ontologically complete as regards his human nature. Though he is not in communion with other humans, he is fully human, lacking nothing essential to his human constitution. Christ was in all things like unto us with one exception — sin. What we see from the incarnation itself, therefore, refutes the idea that communion with other humans is essential to being human.
Critical Theory and Poststructuralism: In Search of a Context (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 68. (emphasis added)
“Michel Foucault as ‘Thin’ Communitarian: Difference, Community, Democracy”, in Cultural Studies ←→Critical Methodologies Vol. 2, No. 4 (2002), 489. (emphasis added)
See Ps 19:1-4, Acts 14:15-17 & 17:22-28, Rom 1:18-32.
Emphasis added.